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Abstract
Recent experiments have indicated that it is possible to systematically lead
subjects to less rened equilibria in signaling games. In this paper, we seek
to understand the process by which this occurs using Camerer and Ho's Ex-
perience Weighted Attraction (EWA) model of learning in games. We rst
adapt the model to extensive-form signaling games by specifying that senders
update the chosen message for both the realized and unrealized type, but
do not update the unchosen message. We test this model against the choice
reinforcement and belief-based special cases of EWA; the latter is of particu-
lar interest because it formalizes the story about convergence to less rened
equilibria oered by Brandts and Holt. We also test a variety of models which
update unchosen messages. We nd that while the Brandts-Holt story cap-
tures the the direction of switching from one strategy to another, it does not
do a good job at capturing the rate at which the switching occurs. EWA does
quite well at predicting the rate of switching, and is slightly bettered by the
unchosen message models, which all perform equally well.

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1 Introduction
For a noncooperative game of any complexity, it is likely that people learn
how to play the game through experience, rather than gure it out by rea-
soning. A general theory of learning is therefore crucial for understanding
equilibration theoretically, and for explaining the changes in strategic behav-
ior observed in the lab and in the eld.
Most research on learning in games has focussed on either of two ap-
proaches: Reinforcement models, in which payos to strategies increase the
likelihood of playing those strategies in the future; and belief-based models,
in which players construct a belief from the observed history of other play-
ers' play, and optimize (perhaps imperfectly) given their beliefs. Camerer
and Ho (1999a,b) introduced a general model, called `experience-weighted
attraction learning' (EWA), which combines the most psychologically plau-
sible and empirically useful elements of the reinforcement and belief learning
approaches. The crucial insight is that belief learning is exactly the same
as a kind of generalized reinforcement learning in which strategies which are
not actually chosen are also reinforced according to the foregone payo they
would have yielded. Camerer and Ho estimate parameters of the model on
four experimental data sets from normal-form games. They nd that it is
necessary to use elements of both approaches in order to explain observed
learning.
In this paper we apply the EWA model to experimental data from sender-
receiver signaling games. Signaling games are very widely used to model eco-
nomic and political phenomena in which actions|perhaps apparently irra-
tional ones leading to avoidable ineÆciencies|are taken to convey asymmet-
ric information. Applications include strategic delay in strikes, rm behavior
in industrial organization theories, labor and insurance markets with hidden
action and hidden information, \money-burning" models of gift-giving, and
many more (see, for example, Tirole, 1988, and Gibbons, 1992).
EWA, and most other learning models, have previously been applied only
to normal-form games. Extensive-form games with incomplete information,
like signaling games, demand special modications which extend EWA's
scope. The key problem is that players do not always know the foregone
payo to a strategy which they did not choose (because its payo depends
on other players' types or moves, which they do not observe), and because
foregone payos are used to update unchosen strategies, an extension is nec-
essary when foregone payos are not known. However, since players know
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the set of possible foregone payos, we extend EWA by reinforcing unchosen
strategies according to some mixture of the foregone payos in that set.
Studying learning in signaling games is especially interesting because
these games often have many equilibria. There are a large number of `re-
nement' concepts which are routinely used to justify why some equilibria
are empirically likely and others are not. However, these renements usu-
ally assume players are reasoning particularly logically. But if players learn
equilibria rather than gure them out, it is an open question whether their
learning will lead to logically rened equilibria more often than unrened
equilibria.
In fact, most experimental tests have yielded somewhat pessimistic re-
sults about the ability of renements, even fairly simple ones, to predict
which equilibria experimental subjects will converge to (e.g., Banks, Camerer
and Porter, 1994). Brandts and Holt (1992, 1993) suggested players in their
experiments were using a particular learning process (essentially a form of
belief learning) (see also Cooper, Kagel and Garvin, 1997a,b). They de-
signed a game in which players learning according to that process would
be led to an equilibrium which violated the Cho-Kreps `intuitive criterion'.
The trick is that during equilibration, players leave empirical \footprints" at
all information sets by choosing strategies which will, later, turn out to be
rarely chosen. When behavior eventually crystallizes around an equilibrium,
and players think about which types of players are likely to make out-of-
equilibrium moves, they use their previous actual experience to form beliefs.
In some games, these empirical beliefs contradict purely logical arguments
about which players would choose the out-of-equilibrium move. The learn-
ing process therefore supports an equilibrium which is not supportable by
standard game-theoretic logic.
Since the Brandts-Holt model is a special kind of belief learning model,
and belief models are nested in EWA as a special case, by applying EWA to
data from signaling experiments we can test the Brandts-Holt theory, and
see whether adding additional EWA elements improves the t.
Our paper therefore makes three contributions: We extend EWA to
extensive-form games with incomplete information, in which there is im-
perfect information about foregone payos. We extend earlier experiments
on signaling games, running them for 32 periods to see if sharper convergence
occurs. Finally, we estimated the extended EWA model (which includes the
Brandts-Holt dynamics as a special case) on the new data.
The paper is organized as follows. First we describe the games and the
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adaptive dynamics conjectured by Brandts and Holt. Then we show their
data, to give the reader a concrete sense of what it is the learning models are
trying to explain. Then the EWA model is described and the modications
necessary to t it to the signaling data are detailed. Then we present data
from new experiments and show how well EWA, its various extensions, and
the belief and reinforcement special cases, explain the data.
2 Adaptive Dynamics and Equilibrium Selec-
tion
1
The main purpose of this paper is to apply EWA to signalling games,
where it may be able explain how learning dynamics can lead player to un-
rened equilibria.
This phenomenon is illustrated by two games taken from Brandts and
Holt (1993), extending work by Banks, Camerer and Porter (1994) and
Brandts and Holt (1992). Tables 1 and 2 show their Games 3 and 5. Nature
chooses Type I or Type II (with equal probabilities) and the sender is told
which half the table will be used to determine payos. The sender then se-
lects M
1
or M
2
, and the receiver is notied of the sender's choice, but not
the type. The receiver then chooses an action, a
1
, a
2
or a
3
. Payos are
determined from the cell in the table described by the type-message-action
triple; the sender's payo is on the left and the receiver's payo is on the
right.
In Game 3, there are two equilibria. Both are sequential but only one
satises the Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion.
2
1
This section provides a detailed account of how empirical histories can contradict
the theoretical criteria on which equilibrium renement arguments are based, and thus
players can be led systematically to less rened equilibria. Readers not interested in this
phenomenon can skip this section without loss of continuity.
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In the intuitive equilibrium both types choose m
2
and are met with the response a
1
,
yielding t
1
s 45 and t
2
s 30. Since t
2
s could conceivably earn more (45) by choosing m
1
instead, the equilibrium only sticks if defections to m
1
are met with responses of a
2
. The
a
2
response to m
1
can only be justied by the belief that m
1
defections are more likely
to have come from t
2
s (i.e., a
2
is optimal for receivers if P (t
2
jm
1
) > 5=7). This inference
does satisfy the intuitive criterion because, indeed, t
2
types might benet by defecting
from m
2
to m
1
whereas t
1
s would never benet. Hence, the equilibrium in which both
types choose m
2
satises the intuitive criterion.
3
In the unintuitive sequential equilibrium, both types of senders (t
1
and t
2
)
send message m
1
. Since both types choose m
1
, receivers come to realize this,
Bayesian-update and form posteriors P (t
1
jm
1
) = P (t
1
) = :5 and P (t
2
jm
1
) =
P (t
2
) = :5. Their best response is then to choose a
1
, which gives expected
payo 45 (:5  0 + :5  90). Note that in this equilibrium, t
1
senders earn 30
and t
2
s earn 45. What prevents the t
1
s from defecting to m
2
, and earning
45 if their message is met with a response of a
1
? The sequential equilibrium
coheres only if receivers choose a
2
in response to message m
2
. (Note that a
3
in response to m
2
is strictly dominated and should never be chosen; in the
experiments, it rarely is.) But why would receivers choose a
2
in response to
m
2
? Receivers must believe that a
2
choices were more likely to be made by
t
2
s (more specically, P (m
2
jt
2
) > 2=3 to justify a choice of a
2
by receivers).
At this point, the intuitive criterion weighs in with a theoretical opinion
about whether P (m
2
jt
2
) > 2=3 is plausible. This belief is not plausible,
the argument goes, because t
2
s earn 45 in equilibrium (from choosing m
1
and getting response a
1
) and could not possibly benet from switching to
m
2
. On the other hand, t
1
s earn 30 in equilibrium and could conceivably
benet if they choose m
2
and are met by the response a
1
, earning 45. Hence,
the intuitive criterion concludes, the o-path belief P (m
2
jt
2
) > 2=3 is not
intuitive because it shifts belief from the prior toward t
2
s, who are least likely
to benet from having picked m
2
.
Note that the argument underlying the intuitive criterion is purely the-
oretical. It deduces from payos the implausibility of t
2
s having switched
from m
1
to m
2
. From a learning point of view, this is only sensible if the
t
2
s have not actually chosen m
2
very often, or if subjects have been choosing
m
1
for a long time and any history of m
2
choices is forgotten or dismissed.
But learning implies a pre-equilibrium convergence process which leaves an
empirical trace of previous m
2
choices. What if, during the learning process,
most players who chose m
2
did happen to be t
2
s? Then the intuitive criterion
competes with an empirical construction of o-path beliefs, recalled from the
equilibration phase in which out-of-equilibrium moves were common (before
such moves became \out of equilibrium"). Faced with a choice between the
logic of the intuitive criterion, and what they observed, it is hard to see
why players would reject previous observation in favor of a purely deductive
argument which agrantly ignores history.
From an equilibrium analysis point of view, Game 5 is identical to Game
3. In the Game 5 sequential equilibrium, both types pick m
1
and are met
with response a
1
, so t
1
s earn 30 and t
2
s earn 45. The t
1
s are prevented
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from defecting to m
2
only if a defection is met with response a
2
, which
is justied if receivers think a defection probably came from a t
2
sender
(P (t
2
jm
2
) > 2=3). But in the m
1
(sequential) equilibrium, t
2
s never do
better defecting while t
1
s might; so the presumption that defections were
probably from t
2
s is unintuitive.
2.1 Experimental Data and the Brandts-Holt Adjust-
ment Dynamic
Figure 1 summarizes BH's results for games 3 and 5. In their experiments,
subjects switch roles and play for 12 periods. The data shown are averages
of 4-period blocks.
In Game 3, they observe signicant initial type separation| in the rst
block m
1
is three times more likely to be chosen by a t
1
sender than a t
2
sender. BH explain this by assuming that senders start with a diuse prior
on what the likely action responses will be. With a diuse prior, the expected
payos for t
1
s are 30 (=(45+15+30)/3) and 25 (=(30+0+45)/3) for the two
messages, so t
1
tends to choose message m
1
more. The expected payos for
t
2
are 20 and 30, so t
2
s choose m
2
more often.
If receivers also start with diuse priors on which types chose a particular
message, they should assign the highest expected payos to action a
1
in
response to m
1
, and a
1
in response to m
2
. However, they are more likely to
choose a
2
in response to m
2
. This happens quickly (in the rst two periods)
so it appears that receivers have anticipated the type-separation, or learned
it very quickly, and use it update their beliefs that a message m
2
choice came
from a t
2
, which makes the action response a
2
optimal. As the game continues
and t
2
players continue to receive a
2
responses to m
2
, they earn payos of 15
and begin to switch to m
1
. In the last four-period block all the t
1
s pick m
1
and about 60% of the t
2
s pick m
1
, so equilibration goes reasonably swiftly in
the direction of the intuitive sequential equilibrium in which both types pool
on m
1
.
That equilibrium is supported by the belief that a message m
2
would be
chosen by a t
2
(who could conceivably benet), leading the receiver to choose
a
2
in response, which yields a lower payo for the type t
2
than she receives
from pooling on m
1
, which keeps her from defecting. Because of the initial
type separation, most of the historical choices of m
1
were from t
2
s, so there
were few observations which conicted with the intuitive criterion.
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Game 5, in contrast, is designed so that observations which are likely to
emerge from early disequilibrium play will conict with the intuitive criterion.
This is indeed what happens. In early periods, nearly all t
1
senders choose
m
1
and most t
2
s choose m
2
. Receivers seem to anticipate, or learn quickly,
that dierent types choose dierent messages, and they tend toward actions
which are best responses given the type separation, i.e., a
2
jm
1
and a
1
jm
2
.
Recall that in the unintuitive sequential equilibrium in which both types
choosem
2
, defection tom
1
is prevented if receivers will think such a defection
came from a t
2
. Indeed, since the empirical probability of m
1
jt
2
is high, their
belief is justied by past experience (though it conicts with the cold logic of
the intuitive criterion). This highlights the need for a theory of equilibrium
selection which includes a description of the convergence path and respects
the way the observed convergence aects players' later beliefs. Without a
story about how observations conict with rational conjectures about beliefs,
it is hard to explain this convergence to the less rened equilibrium.
In the Brandts and Holt story (1993), players start with beliefs about
what others will do and revise their beliefs in the light of what they observe.
3
The belief story does seem to explain the major features of the data. However,
in the empirical literature on learning it has been shown that one model
seems to explain a convergence path reasonably well, but then be rejected in
favor of a competing model when they are compared carefully. Since EWA
learning includes belief-based learning as a special case, but mixes in three
elements of reinforcement learning (exible initial conditions, cumulation of
reinforcement, and extra weight on received payos), it is possible that adding
these features to the BH story will improve the t.
3 EWA Learning
Experience-weighted attraction learning was introduced to hybridize ele-
ments of reinforcement and belief-based approaches to learning and includes
familiar variants of both as special cases. This section will highlight only
the most important features of the model. Further details are available in
Camerer and Ho (1999b).
3
Cooper, Kagel and Garvin (1997a,b) give a similar explanation for results in limit
pricing experiments with an important twist: players assume others do not violate domi-
nance.
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In EWA learning, strategies have attraction levels which are updated ac-
cording to either the payos the strategies actually provided, or some fraction
of the payos unchosen strategies would have provided. These attractions are
decayed or depreciated each period, and also normalized by a factor which
captures the (decayed) amount of experience players have accumulated. At-
tractions to strategies are then related to the probability of choosing those
strategies using a response function which guarantees that more attractive
strategies are played more often.
EWA was originally designed to study n-person normal form games. The
players are indexed by i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n), and each one has a strategy space
S
i
= fs
1
i
; s
2
i
; : : : ; s
`
i
 1
i
; s
`
i
i
g, where s
i
denotes a pure strategy of player i. The
strategy space for the game is the Cartesian products of the S
i
, S = S
1
S
2

: : : S
n
. Let s = (s
1
; s
2
; : : : ; s
n
) denote a strategy combination consisting of
n strategies, one for each player. Let s
 i
= (s
1
; : : : ; s
i 1
; s
i+1
; : : : ; s
n
) denote
the strategies of everyone but player i. The game description is completed
with specication of a payo function 
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) 2 <, which is the payo i
receives for playing s
i
when everyone else is playing the strategy specied
in the strategy combination s
 i
. Finally, let s
i
(t) denote i's actual strategy
choice in period t, and s
 i
(t) the vector chosen by all other players. Thus,
player i's payo in period t is given by 
i
(s
i
(t); s
 i
(t)).
3.1 Updating Rules
The EWA model updates two variables after each round. The rst variable is
the experience weight N(t), which is like a count of `observation-equivalents'
of past experience and is used to weight lagged attractions when they are
updated. The second variable is A
j
i
(t), the attraction of a strategy after
period t has taken place.
The variables N(t) and A
j
i
(t) begin with initial values N(0) and A
j
i
(0).
These prior values can be thought of as reecting pregame experience, either
due to learning transferred from dierent games or due to introspection.
Updating after a period of play is governed by two rules. First, experience
weights are updated according to
N(t) =  N(t  1) + 1; t  1: (1)
The parameter  can be thought of as a depreciation rate or retrospective
discount factor that measures the fractional impact of previous experience,
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compared to one new period. Notice that the steady-state value of N(t) is
1
1 
(and does not depend on N(0)). In the estimation we usually impose
the restriction N(0) 
1
1 
which guarantees that the experience weight rises
over time, so the relative weight on new payos falls and learning slows down.
The second rule updates the level of attraction. A key component of
the updating is the payo that a strategy either yielded, or would have
yielded, in a period. The model weights hypothetical payos that unchosen
strategies would have earned by a parameter Æ, and weights payo actually
received, from chosen strategy s
i
(t), by an additional 1   Æ (so it receives
a total weight of 1). Using an indicator function I(x; y) which equals 1 if
x = y and 0 if x 6= y, the weighted payo for i's j
th
strategy can be written
[Æ + (1  Æ)  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))]  
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)).
The rule for updating attraction sets A
j
i
(t) to be a depreciated, experience-
weighted lagged attraction, plus an increment for the received or foregone
payo, normalized by the new experience weight. That is,
A
j
i
(t) =
 N(t  1)  A
j
i
(t  1) + [Æ + (1  Æ)  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))]  
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t))
N(t)
: (2)
The factor  is a discount factor that depreciates previous attractions.
Finally, attractions must be related to the probabilities of choosing strate-
gies in some way. Obviously we would like P
j
i
(t) to be monotonically increas-
ing in A
j
i
(t) and decreasing in A
k
i
(t) (where k 6= j). Three forms have been
used in previous research: A logit or exponential form, a power form, and
a normal (probit) form. The various probability functions each have advan-
tages and disadvantages. We prefer the logit form
P
j
i
(t + 1) =
e
A
j
i
(t)
P
m
i
k=1
e
A
k
i
(t)
(3)
because it allows negative attractions and seems to t a little better in a direct
comparison with the power form (Camerer and Ho, 1998). The parameter
 measures sensitivity of players to dierences among attractions. When
 is small, probabilities are not very sensitive to dierences in attractions
(when  = 0 all strategies are equally likely to be chosen). As  increases, it
converges to a best-response function in which the strategy with the highest
attraction is always chosen.
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3.2 The Cumulative Reinforcement Special Case of EWA
One special case of EWA is choice reinforcement models in which strategies
have levels of reinforcement or propensity which are depreciated and incre-
mented by received payos. In the model of Harley (1981) and Roth and
Erev (1995), for example
R
j
i
(t) =
(
 R
j
i
(t  1) + 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)) if s
j
i
= s
i
(t);
 R
j
i
(t  1) if s
j
i
6= s
i
(t):
(4)
Using the indicator function, the two equations can be reduced to one:
R
j
i
(t) =  R
j
i
(t  1) + I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))  
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)): (5)
It is easy to see that this updating formula is a special case of the EWA
rule, when Æ = 0, N(0) = 1, and  = 0. Some people have argued that
reinforcement learning of this sort may be an adequate approximation of
human learning in games, even though it is simple (and has been largely
abandoned by cognitive psychologists studying humans). The adequacy of
the approximation can be tested empirically by setting the parameters to
their restricted values and seeing how much t is compromised (adjusting, of
course, for degrees of freedom).
3.3 The Belief-Based Special Case of EWA
In belief-based models, adaptive players base their responses on beliefs formed
by observing their opponents' past plays. While there are many ways of form-
ing beliefs, we consider a fairly general `weighted ctitious play' model, which
includes ctitious play (Brown, 1951) and Cournot best-response (Cournot,
1960) as special cases.
In weighted ctitious play, players begin with prior beliefs about what
the other players will do, which are expressed as ratios of counts to the
total experience. Denote total experience by N(t) =
P
m
 i
k=1
N
k
 i
(t).
4
Express
the probability that others will play strategy k as B
k
 i
(t) =
N
k
 i
(t)
N(t)
, with
N
k
 i
(t)  0 and N(t) > 0.
4
Note that N(t) is not subscripted because the count of frequencies is assumed, in our
estimation, to be the same for all players. Obviously this restriction can be relaxed in
future research.
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Beliefs are updated by depreciating the previous counts by , and adding
one for the strategy combination actually chosen by the other players. That
is,
B
k
 i
(t) =
 N
k
 i
(t  1) + I(s
k
 i
; s
 i
(t))
P
`
 i
h=1
[ N
h
 i
(t  1) + I(s
h
 i
; s
 i
(t))]
: (6)
This form of belief updating weights the belief from one period ago  times as
much as the most recent observation, so  can be interpreted as how quickly
previous experience is discarded.
5
When  = 0 players weight only the most
recent observation (Cournot dynamics); when  = 1 all previous observations
count equally (ctitious play).
Given these beliefs, we can compute expected payos in each period t,
E
j
i
(t) =
m
 i
X
k=1
B
k
 i
(t)(s
j
i
; s
k
 i
): (7)
The crucial step is to express period t expected payos as a function of period
t  1 expected payos. This yields:
E
j
i
(t) =
 N(t  1)  E
j
i
(t  1) + (s
j
i
; s
 i
(t))
 N(t  1) + 1
: (8)
If the initial attractions in the EWA model are expected payos given some
initial beliefs (i.e., A
j
i
(0) = E
j
i
(0)), the attraction depreciation rate  equals
the experience depreciation rate , and foregone payos are weighted as
strongly as received payos (Æ = 1), then EWA attractions are exactly the
same as expected payos.
This demonstrates a surprising kinship between reinforcement and belief
approaches. Belief learning is a kind of generalized reinforcement learning in
which strategies are reinforced equally strongly by actual payos and foregone
payos, reinforcements are weighted averages, and initial reinforcements must
spring from prior beliefs.
5
Some people interpret this parameter as an index of `forgetting', but this interpreta-
tion is misleading because people may recall the previous experience perfectly (or have it
available in `external memory' on computer software) but they will deliberately discount
old experience if they think new information is more useful in forecasting what others will
do.
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3.4 Interpreting EWA
We believe one of the strengths of EWA is that its parameters have sensible
psychological interpretations.
The parameter Æ measures the relative weight given to foregone payos,
compared to actual payos, in updating attractions. It can be interpreted
as a kind of `imagination' of foregone payos, or responsiveness to foregone
payos (when Æ is larger players move more strongly toward ex post best
responses).
The parameter  is naturally interpreted as depreciation of past attrac-
tions, A(t). The parameter  depreciates the experience measure N(t). It
captures something like decay in the strength of prior beliefs, which is gen-
erally dierent than decay of early attraction (captured by ). In a game-
theoretic context,  and  will be aected by the degree to which players
realize other players are adapting, so that old observations on what others
did become less and less useful. Then  and  can be interpreted as indices
of the perceived rate of change.
The relation between  and  determines the growth rate of attractions,
which in turn aects how sharply players converge. To see this, set Æ = 1 for
simplicity, and rewrite the updating equation as
A
j
i
(t) =
(=)   N(t  1)  A
j
i
(t  1) + 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t))
N(t   1) + 1
: (9)
If  = , the rst term in the numerator is one and disappears. Then
attractions are evidently just a weighted average of lagged attractions and
previous payos, where the weights are N(t 1) and 1. Then the attractions
will be bounded by the scale of the payos; they will never grow too far apart.
If  > , then the attractions are kind of `inated' weighted average
where the depreciated, experience-weighted lagged attraction is multiplied
by an ination rate


. Then attractions can grow outside the bounds of the
payos, which means that attractions for strategies can grow farther apart.
In the extreme case where  = 0, N(t) = 1 for t  1 and the attractions are
simply
A
j
i
(t) =  A
j
i
(t  1) + 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)): (10)
That is, attractions are just (depreciated) cumulative payos.
Whether attractions grow or not is important because in the logit model,
only the dierence among the attractions determines their relative probabil-
ities of being chosen. (A constant added to all the attractions divides out
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in the logit form.) Therefore, if attractions can grow and grow, as they can
when  > , then the dierences in strategy attractions can be very large.
This implies that, for a xed response sensitivity, , the probabilities can be
spread farther apart; convergence to playing a single strategy almost all the
time can be sharper. If attractions cannot grow outside of the payo bounds,
when  = , then convergence cannot produce choice probabilities which are
so extreme.
The term A
j
i
(0) represents the initial attraction, which might be derived
from some analysis of the game, from selection principles or decision rules,
from surface similarity between strategies in the game being played and
strategies which were successful in similar games, etc. Belief models im-
pose strong restrictions on A
j
i
(0) by requiring initial attractions to be de-
rived from prior beliefs.
6
Additionally, they require attraction updating with
Æ = 1 and  = . EWA allows one to separate these two processes: Players
could have arbitrary initial attractions but begin to update attractions in a
belief-learning way after they gain experience.
The initial-attraction weightN(0) is in the EWA model to allow players in
belief-based models to have an initial prior which has a strength (measured in
units of actual experience). In EWA, N(0) is therefore naturally interpreted
as the strength of initial attractions, relative to incremental changes in at-
tractions due to actual experience and payos. The eect of N(0) is easiest
to see by xing Æ = 1 for simplicity and directly computing the attraction
after two periods, A
j
i
(2), which gives
A
j
i
(2) =

2
 A
j
i
(0) N(0) +   
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(1)) + 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(2))

2
N(0) + + 1
: (11)
The parameter  captures the declining weight placed on payos from more
distant periods of actual experience (that is, the period 1 payo 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(1))
is weighted  but the period 2 payo 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(2)) is not). Like previous
payos, the initial attraction is also weighted by a power of  (
2
, because
it `happened' two periods earlier), but is also weighted by N(0). Thus, the
6
This requires, for example, that weakly dominated strategies will always have (weakly)
lower initial attractions than dominant strategies. EWA allows more exibility. For ex-
ample, players might choose randomly at rst, choose what they chose previously in a
dierent game, or set a strategy's initial attraction equal to its minimum payo (the mini-
max rule) or maximum payo (the maximax rule). All these decision rules generate initial
attractions which are not generally allowed by belief models, but are permitted in EWA
because A
j
i
(0) are exible.
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parameter N(0) captures the special weight placed on the initial attractions,
compared to increments in attraction due to actual (or foregone) payos. If
N(0) is small then the eect of the initial attractions wears o very quickly
(compared to the eect of actual experience). If N(0) is large then the eect
of the initial attractions persists.
7
In previous research, the EWA model has been estimated on several sam-
ples of experimental data, and estimates have been used to predict out-of-sample.
8
Compared to the belief and reinforcement special cases, EWA ts better in
weak-link coordination games (Camerer and Ho, 1999a) and predicts better
out of sample in median-action coordination games and dominance solvable
\p-beauty contests" (Camerer and Ho, 1999b), call markets (Hsia, 1998) and
\unprotable games" (Morgan and Sefton, 1998). In some constant-sum
games, EWA predicts slightly worse than belief learning (Camerer and Ho,
1999b).
3.5 Extending EWA to Signaling Games
The rst question to address in extending EWA to signaling games is what
constitutes a strategy. In these games, we denote types by t
i
, messages by
m
j
, and actions by a
k
. The sender and receiver earn payos 
S
(t
i
; m
j
; a
k
)
and 
R
(t
i
; m
j
; a
k
), respectively. Because senders observe their own types, it
is appropriate to dene their strategies conditional on observed types. There
are two options.
First, one could dene contingency strategies which specify a message
for each type. For example, (m
1
jt
1
; m
2
jt
2
) is a strategy in which the sender
plays m
1
if t
1
is observed, and m
2
if t
2
is observed. This approach assumes
that a sender chooses a complete strategy in each period (a strategy for each
type), but only \uses" the portion which is relevant for their observed type.
In games in which complete strategies are elicited this modeling approach
seems reasonable. However, in the experiments we study complete strategies
are not elicited. The complete-strategy approach then begs the question of
how to update attractions for several complete strategies which have the
same \used" portion but dierent \unused" portions. For example, suppose
7
This enables one to test equilibrium theories as a special kind of (non)-learning theory
with N(0) very large and initial attractions equal to equilibrium payos.
8
Nota Bene forecasting out of sample completely removes any inherent advantage of
EWA over restricted special cases due to having more parameters; indeed, if EWA ts well
by overtting, it will predict especially poorly out of sample.
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the sender is t
1
and the chosen message is m
2
. How does one update both
(m
2
jt
1
; m
1
jt
2
) and (m
2
jt
1
; m
2
jt
2
)?
We take a second approach, which is to assume that players have dierent
strategy sets at each reachable node, which are not linked to form complete
strategies. (This is similar to the \agent form" game in which each node
is played by a dierent \agent" for a single player, and all the agents have
the same payo.) In the example above, we simply update the attraction on
m
2
jt
1
in the example (and perhaps also m
1
jt
1
, which the player could have
chosen but did not) and leave attractions for the unused strategies, m
1
jt
2
and m
2
jt
2
, unchanged. Similarly, we assume receivers have strategies which
are conditional on the message they observed the sender choosing, but not
on the sender's type. A receiver's strategy to choose action i in response to
message j will be denoted a
i
jm
j
.
Initial attractions for t
1
senders are denoted A
m
1
t
1
(0) and A
m
2
t
1
(0), and
for t
2
senders, the initial attractions are A
m
1
t
2
(0) and A
m
2
t
2
(0). (In the logit
form one of the attractions in each pair must be xed for identiability.) The
initial experience counts are N
m
1
S
(0) and N
m
2
S
(0).
For receivers who observe message m
1
, initial attractions are A
a
1
m
1
(0),
A
a
2
m
1
(0), and A
a
3
m
1
(0). For receivers who observe message m
2
, the initial
attractions are A
a
1
m
2
(0), A
a
2
m
2
(0), and A
a
3
m
2
(0). (One of the attractions in
each triple must be xed for identiability). The initial experience counts
are N
m
1
R
(0) and N
m
2
R
(0).
3.6 The Baseline Model
This section discusses how the EWA model presented in equations 1 and 2
can be adapted to signaling games. For receivers, this is a simple problem
because they can condition only on the sender's message. Thus, the receivers
know what their foregone payos are at the end of each period: they update
their attraction to their chosen strategy with their realized payo, and to
other strategies with (Æ times) the foregone payo given by the actual type
and message. If the receiver had chosen a
1
in response to m
1
when the sender
was a t
2
, for example, she would update according to:
N
m
1
R
(t+ 1) =  N
m
1
R
+ 1 (12)
A
a
1
m
1
(t+ 1) =
  A
a
1
m
1
(t) N
m
1
R
(t) + 
R
(t
2
; m
1
; a
1
)
 N
m
1
R
(t) + 1
(13)
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Aa
2
m
1
(t+ 1) =
  A
a
2
m
1
(t) N
m
1
R
(t) + Æ  
R
(t
2
; m
1
; a
2
)
 N
m
1
R
(t) + 1
(14)
A
a
3
m
1
(t+ 1) =
  A
a
3
m
1
(t) N
m
1
R
(t) + Æ  
R
(t
2
; m
1
; a
3
)
 N
m
1
R
(t) + 1
: (15)
Since she does not observe m
2
, N
m
2
R
(t+ 1) = N
m
2
R
(t) and A
a
k
m
2
(t+ 1) =
A
a
k
m
2
(t) for k = 1; 2; 3.
The senders' chosen strategies are updated according to the realized pay-
os in the same way. However, with senders, it is more diÆcult to dene
foregone payos to unchosen strategies. There are two complications.
First, conditioning on a sender's type, the foregone payo to the unchosen
message is not known perfectly because it depends on the receiver's unob-
served response. The sender knows the set of possible payos, but she does
not know which payo in the set would have resulted. Of course, this is
generally the case in extensive-form games with unreached information sets.
Below we consider several ways of choosing a foregone payo in the set, or
some mixture of those payos, to update the attraction on the unchosen
message. In the baseline model, however, we simply leave attractions for un-
chosen sender messages unreinforced (and thus do not decay their experience
counts).
The second complication is that belief models implicitly require that the
attraction for the choice of the chosen message by the unrealized type also
be updated by that type's foregone payo. The reason is that senders are
forming beliefs about expected reactions to chosen messages. How a re-
ceiver reacts when a t
1
sender chooses a message informs the sender's belief
about the receiver's reaction when a t
2
sender chooses the same message,
thus aecting t
2
's expected payos (or in EWA terms, the attractions of t
2
s
strategies). This is reasonable because the sender knows the receiver's strate-
gies may be message-dependent but cannot be type-dependent, so she knows
exactly what the foregone payo would have been if the unrealized type had
chosen the same message the realized type did. For example, if a t
1
sender
sends message m
1
and gets response a
1
, she receives payo 
S
(t
1
; m
1
; a
1
) and
updates A
m
1
t
1
accordingly. But she also knows that if she had been a t
2
and chosen m
1
, she would have earned 
S
(t
2
; m
1
; a
1
). Therefore, the sender
updates according to
N
m
1
S
(t+ 1) =  N
m
1
S
+ 1 (16)
A
m
1
t
1
(t+ 1) =
  A
m
1
t
1
(t) N
m
1
S
(t) + 
S
(t
1
; m
1
; a
1
)
 N
m
1
S
(t) + 1
(17)
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Am
1
t
2
(t+ 1) =
  A
m
1
t
2
(t) N
m
1
S
(t) + Æ  
S
(t
2
; m
1
; a
1
)
 N
m
1
S
(t) + 1
(18)
and N
m
2
S
(t+ 1) = N
m
2
S
(t) and A
m
2
t
k
(t + 1) = A
m
2
t
k
(t) for k = 1; 2.
The updating rules for the receivers are relatively straightforward. How-
ever, the notion of a foregone type, giving up something over which one never
had a choice can be confusing. The models we propose in section 3.7 are more
complicated still because they suggest ways senders might update attractions
for unchosen messages. Because updating rules for dierent combinations of
realized and unrealized types and chosen and unchosen messages can get
confusing, we will display update rules for senders in the game table. To
illustrate the baseline update rule described above, we will use the following
form:
Type I Type II
a
1
a
2
a
3
a
1
a
2
a
3
M
1
A
m1t1
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+
S
(m
1
;t
1
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
A
m1t2
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+Æ
S
(m
1
;t
2
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
M
2
A
m2t1
S
(t) A
m2t2
S
(t)
Tabular representation of sender's baseline update rules.
The underlined labels indicate that these rules represent an example where
the realized type is t
1
, the chosen message is m
1
and the chosen action is a
1
.
There are four cells in the table, one for each strategy-information set com-
bination to which the sender has an attraction. In each cell is the attraction
update rule for that cell given the the realized type and chosen message and
response. In this case, Equation 17 is represented in the upper left cell, where
the sender increases her attraction with the full weight of the realized payo.
The upper right cell demonstrates how the foregone type is used: since the
receiver's choice is message and not type dependent, the sender knows that
had the type been t
2
, she would have realized 
S
(m
1
; t
2
; a
1
), but because this
is only hypothetical, it is weighted by the imagination parameter, Æ (Equa-
tion 18). The cells in the lower row do not have an update rule, indicating
that the attractions are just copied from one period to the next; there is
no new information. To further simplify presenting the update rules, the
denominator of the cells indicates how the experience counts are updated.
For the baseline rule, the experience count of the chosen message is updated
according to Equation 16, and the experience count of the unchosen message
is simply copied into the next period.
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3.6.1 Special Cases of EWA
The choice reinforcement and belief-based special cases of EWA discussed
above apply, without much modication, to this adaptation of EWA for sig-
nalling games. The reinforcement model is still realized if Æ = 0,  = 0 and
N
m
1
R
= N
m
2
R
= N
m
1
S
= N
m
2
S
= 1. However, the extension of the belief-based
model is less obvious because it requires estimating initial belief counts rather
than initial attractions.
In addition to setting Æ = 1 and  = , we implement the belief model's
implicit constraints on the A(0)s by estimating them indirectly: we esti-
mate belief counts for each of the opponent's strategies and computing A(0)s
by using these estimates to compute expected values. Thus, for the sender
we estimate N
a
1
m
1
(0), N
a
2
m
1
(0), N
a
3
m
1
(0), which must sum to N
m
1
S
(0) and
N
a
1
m
2
(0), N
a
2
m
2
(0), N
a
3
m
2
(0), which must sum to N
m
2
S
(0), and for the re-
ceiver we estimate N
m
1
t
1
(0), N
m
1
t
2
(0) which sum to N
m
1
R
(0) and N
m
2
t
1
(0),
N
m
2
t
2
(0), which must sum to N
m
2
R
(0).
3.7 Unchosen Message Models
The appeal of the baseline model is that the sender is making all valid in-
ferences: the receiver would have chosen the same action had the type been
dierent, so the sender knows what her exact payo would have been in the
unrealized type case. However, the baseline model does not build in an an-
swer to the sender's natural question, \Did I choose the right message, or
should I have chosen the other message, given my realized type?" The alter-
native models presented here consider the possibility that a sender tries to
force an answer to that question, using various imperfect inferences about
what her payo would have been had she chosen the other message.
9
3.7.1 The Median Payo
The sender knows the payo to the unchosen message (conditional on the
realized type) would have been one of three numbers. One way the sender
may assign a foregone payo is to use some statistic which is representative of
9
Another model is that the sender assumes the receiver would have chosen the same
(observed) action even if the sender had sent the other message. This neglects the sender's
knowledge that the receiver's action choices could be message-dependent. It seems unlikely
to t the data better so we have not investigated it empirically.
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those three numbers. The median is one such statistic. It is computationally
simple, and more robust than say, the minimum or the maximum of the
payos.
Implementing alternate message updating requires a number of adjust-
ments to the update rule. Let MED(
S
jm
2
; t
2
) denote MED(
S
(m
2
; t
2
; a
1
);

S
(m
2
; t
2
; a
2
); 
S
(m
2
; t
2
; a
3
)). Then rules used for each cell are represented
in the table below.
Type I Type II
a
1
a
2
a
3
a
1
a
2
a
3
M
1
A
m1t1
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+
S
(m
1
;t
1
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
A
m1t2
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+Æ
S
(m
1
;t
2
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
M
2


A
m2t1
S
(t)N
m2
S
(t)+
1
MED(
S
jm
2
;t
1
)


N
m2
S
(t)+


A
m2t2
S
(t)N
m2
S
(t)+
2
MED(
S
jm
2
;t
2
)


N
m2
S
(t)+
Tabular representation of sender's median model update rules.
The second row of the table gives the update rules for the unchosen message,
for both the realized and unrealized type. The new parameters 
1
and 
2
can be interpreted similar to Æ; they represent the weight, or vividness of
imagination, used in updating the attractions to the unchosen message for
realized and unrealized types, respectively.
The other new parameter,  , allows for the possibility that updating
an unchosen message by the median foregone payo does not have as much
psychological impact as updating chosen messages, and hence is not the same
as a single period of `real' experience. In addition to being the increment to
the unchosen message experience counter,  is also an exponent of  and  for
unchosen messages and it multiplies 
1
and 
2
. These additional appearances
of  in the updating equation allow it to be interpreted as the fraction of a
period's experience in the unchosen message gained in conjecturing about
and updating the unchosen message attraction. To see this, imagine that
 = 1. The unchosen message rules reduce to the chosen message rules with
Æ equal to 
1
and 
2
for the realized and unrealized types respectively. On
the other hand, if  = 0, the unchosen message attractions are not discounted
and no payo is added to them, so they are unchanged.
3.7.2 Convex Combinations of Minimum and Maximum Payos
Another way to update foregone payos is to take a convex combination
of the minimum and maximum possible payos. Because the weights used
can vary from game to game, the model need not be sensitive to extremely
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high or extremely low outlier payos, yet it can be more robust to attractive
payos than the median rule. For example, if players frequently switch to
unchosen messages, their `grass-is-greener-on-the-other-side' switching could
be captured by assuming they are optimistically putting a lot of weight on the
maximum foregone payo. Alternatively, if their message switching is slow
their inertia could be modeled by assuming they are pessimistically putting
a lot of weight on the minimum foregone payo.
Let (m
2
; t
1
) = MIN(
S
jm
2
; t
1
) + (1  )MAX(
S
jm
2
; t
1
). Then the
convex combination model can be written
Type I Type II
a
1
a
2
a
3
a
1
a
2
a
3
M
1
A
m1t1
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+
S
(m
1
;t
1
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
A
m1t2
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+Æ
S
(m
1
;t
2
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
M
2


A
m2t1
S
(t)N
m2
S
(t)+
1
(m
2
;t
1
)


N
m2
S
(t)+


A
m2t2
S
(t)N
m2
S
(t)+
2
(m
2
;t
2
)


N
m2
S
(t)+
Tabular representation of sender's convex combination model update rules.
This model is implemented just like the median model, except for the
addition of the parameter , which is the fraction of weight put on the
minimum.
3.7.3 Mirror Sophistication: Internal Models of Other Players
A nal model of unchosen message foregone payo formulation assumes that
players use all information available to them, including using their own be-
havior as a proxy for others'. Since subjects played both roles in the course
of the experiment, it is not necessary for senders to use a rule of thumb to
guess about the receiver's response|a sender can appeal to the attractions
of her receiver alter-ego's actions to compute the probability of each action
response to the unchosen message. Her expected payo from the unchosen
message will be the expected payo from playing somebody like herself. We
call this `mirror sophistication' because players form a guess about what a
player in another role will do by looking in a proverbial mirror at their own
behavior when they were in that role.
10
10
Obviously, this rule will be sensitive to the experimental protocol and does not apply
if the players do not switch rules. We regard this protocol-sensitivity as an advantage.
There is a strong intuition among experimentalists that players do learn faster when they
switch roles, which is supportive of such a rule. This is easily testable, by comparing
experiments with dierent degrees of role-switching.
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Let p
S
(a
1
jm
1
) denote the probability with which the sender's receiver
alter-ego would choose a
1
given the messagem
1
. Let (m
2
; t
1
) =
P
3
j=1
p
S
(a
j
jm
2
)
S
(m
2
; t
1
; a
j
).
Then the simple sophistication model can be expressed as in the table below.
Type I Type II
a
1
a
2
a
3
a
1
a
2
a
3
M
1
A
m1t1
S
(t)N
m1
S
(t)+
S
(m
1
;t
1
;a
1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
A
m1t2
S
(t)N
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S
(t)+Æ
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1
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2
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1
)
N
m1
S
(t)+1
M
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A
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S
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m2
S
(t)+
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2
;t
1
)


N
m2
S
(t)+


A
m2t2
S
(t)N
m2
S
(t)+
2
(m
2
;t
2
)


N
m2
S
(t)+
Tabular representation of sender's mirror sophistication model update rules.
The parameters are interpreted exactly as in the two previous models.
However, this model departs slightly from the spirit of EWA because this
implementation of mirror-sophistication implies a belief-based interpretation
of attractions. In standard EWA, the learner never directly asks herself
what her opponent will do in order to best respond, as she does when using
a belief-based model. In this model, however, the sophisticated learner does
ask herself what she believes her opponent will do. Although the beliefs
are still determined by EWA, this makes the mirror-sophistication model
incompatible with a reinforcement interpretation. This is not particularly
surprising because reinforcement learning uses only realized payo streams,
holding no direct role for how opponents adapt.
4 Experimental Results
In order to test our baseline adaptation of EWA, its choice reinforcement and
belief-based special cases, and our unchosen message updating extensions,
we use Brandts and Holt's games 3 and 5. However, while the 12 periods
of data on 24 subjects they generated is suÆcient to grasp the intuition
behind the Brandts and Holt story, estimating a structural model as complex
as EWA, and distinguishing it from special cases, requires more statistical
power. Therefore, we replicated Brandts and Holt's (1993) games 3 and 5
with 32 subjects playing 32 periods.
For our replication, we recruited Caltech undergraduates who did not
necessarily have any training in economics, although many had participated
in other experiments. We used a standard signaling game software which
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presented the game table as in Tables 1 and 2.
11
In each period, the senders
were randomly selected, informed of the type and prompted for their message.
When all senders had selected a message, receivers were notied of their
paired sender's choice and were asked to chose a response. They knew that
each type was equally likely ex ante. At the end of each period the realized cell
of the payo table was highlighted and subjects wrote down their payos.
There were four cohorts of eight subjects, and we used a counterbalanced
design, so two cohorts played Game 3 rst and two played Game 5 rst.
Subjects earned an average of about $27 in about two hours, and were paid
in cash as they left the laboratory. The only protocol dierence between our
experiment and Brandts and Holt's is that our pairings were random, with
replacement; we made no attempt to ensure subjects did not play subjects
they had played previously.
Figure 2 presents the data from our experiment, averaged across sessions
in 4-period blocks. The results in Game 3 replicate BH closely, and conrm
that with more experience, play converges reasonably sharply to the intuitive
sequential pooling equilibrium at m
1
, supported by action responses a
1
and
a
2
to the two messages.
The Game 5 results are a little more surprising. We thought additional
periods might cause t
2
s to choose m
1
less and less frequently, cementing con-
vergence to the unintuitive equilibrium at m
2
. However, additional periods
do not eliminate the separation between messages. While the patterns are
the same, the senders' strategies during the 13
th
through 32
nd
periods looked
much like the 9
th
through 12
th
periods of the Brandts and Holt data, sug-
gesting the convergence to the sequential equilibrium is not complete, even
after many more periods of learning.
12
However, there is also no evidence of
movement back toward the intuitive equilibrium at m
1
.
13
11
The software we used also had a third message, which we instructed subjects never to
use (they were compliant).
12
We also conducted a session with 64 periods of Game 5 only, to see if longer-run con-
vergence was dierent than what we observed in only 32 periods. There was no additional
movement toward either equilibrium.
13
To test that zero-aversion was preventing some subjects from switching to the unintu-
itve equilibrium, we ran eight subjects with a payo table which added 15 to each payo
in Game 5 (call this Game 5'). These subjects converged to the unintuitive equilibrium
in about 50 periods. However, we were concerned that the unintuitive equilibrium payo
of 105 may have been focal in that experiment, so we ran two more sessions on a payo
table which multiplied payos in Game 5' by 4/5. This behavior was indistinguishable
from that of players in Game 5.
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5 Estimation
In these models, the initial attractions, experience counts and model param-
eters can be estimated from our experimental data. We computed the max-
imum likelihood parameter estimates for each model using the constrained
maximum likelihood procedure in Gauss (Aptech).
14
To simplify the esti-
mation and make the models easily interpretable, we impose a number of
restrictions on the parameter space. First, we impose bounds on the initial
attractions, so that the set of possible attractions is not much larger for the
EWA model than for the belief models (whose attractions are closely tied to
the payo structure).
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The second restriction is that message-specic experience weights should
be the same for senders and receivers. That is, N
m
1
S
(0) = N
m
1
R
(0) and
N
m
2
S
(0) = N
m
2
R
(0). While there is no a priori reason we think this is so,
tests across a broad sample of data indicate that this is not a statistically
signicant restriction, and it saves two degrees of freedom.
Our nal restriction is that each of the N(0)s must all be less than 50 and
less than
1
1 
. This prevents the model from putting so much weight on the
initial attractions that there is almost no eect of the experience gained in the
14
To ensure we found the peak of any local maximum we located, we used a two-step
search process. From a given starting point, we used the Bernt, Hall, Hall and Hausman
algorithm to search the parameter space. This algorithm estimates the Hessian, rather
than calculates it exactly like Newton methods, and thus nds maxima quite quickly.
However, it is not always precise. From the maximum found by the BHHH algorithm,
we applied Gauss's version of the Newton gradient ascent algorithm. Using an exact
(numerical) Hessian, this second algorithm often produced small improvements in t. To
ensure that the local maxima we found were global maxima, we tested a variety of starting
points. We found the parameter space to be surprisingly well-behaved: in each model all
of our starting points converged to the same maximum, suggesting that our estimates are
in fact global maxima. The Gauss and C code used to estimate parameters is available
from the rst author.
15
We look at the set of possible payos given the information available at the time
of move and bound each initial attraction to be between the minimum and maximum
attainable payos for each strategy. For instance, in Game 5, t
1
senders can earn payos
f45; 0; 0g from m
1
, so A
m1t1
(0) must be in the interval [0; 45] and m
1
receivers can earn
f45; 30g from a
1
, so A
a1m1
(0) must be in [30; 45]. Because one of each type or message
conditional strategy must be a constant in the logit form, we restrict one of the strategies
in each information set to have an initial attraction equal to the minimum attainable
payo. There is no way to determine which strategy should have its attraction set to its
minimum, so we estimated all possible combinations of these restrictions, and report only
the one that yielded the best t.
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play of the game. The restriction N(0) 
1
1 
forces the experience weight
to increase, which means that new payo information is getting less and less
weight compared to lagged attractions; subjects do not have less perceived
experience after playing the game than they brought into the game. Note
that this restriction also requires 0    1 (for positive N(0)).
One of the disadvantages of imposing these restrictions is that it com-
promises the asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood parameter
estimates. While we might already nd this assumption suspect because
of our modest sample size (N = 32), imposing binding bounds restrictions
makes the condence intervals constructed from standard errors computed
from the variance-covariance matrix unreliable. Because values outside the
bound are never observed, the sample variance will be biased downward,
and the condence interval constructed from the standard error may not lie
entirely within the imposed interval. Therefore, we construct bootstrapped
condence intervals using the percentile method.
16
This approach to estimation and inference requires a lot of computing
time, patience and attention to detail. Our objective in taking this intensive
approach is to set a high methodological standard so the learning model dis-
course can focus on theoretical issues, rather than methodological shortcuts
which can cloud conclusions. Often in learning we are trying to tease out
small but signicant eects, the presence or absence of which demonstrate
the supremacy of one model or another. In using the best known estimators
(maximum likelihood) and strong statistical tests (AIC and BIC model cal-
ibration measures) rather than easier to compute but ad hoc statistics, we
create standard for model comparison. This standard will facilitate a direct
comparison of alternative models, rather than alternative methodologies.
5.1 Fitting the Baseline Model
The objective of this paper is to test several models of how people update
unchosen messages and unrealized types in signalling games. The focal point
16
This nonparametric technique requires performing maximum likelihood estimates on
a large number B data sets, where each data set is the sample with each subject weighted
by a Poisson(N) random number (Aptech 1995, 31). This process gives us B estimates
of each parameter, and the 95% condence interval for a parameter is given by that
parameter's 2:5
th
and 97:5
th
order statistics. This method allows us to present the correct
condence intervals without knowing the transformation which would make the actual
error distribution normal (Efron and Tibshirani 1993, 171).
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of this study is the baseline EWA model described in Section 3.6. First,
we test the baseline model against models which are simpler, the choice
reinforcement and belief-based special cases of EWA.
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of EWA and its choice rein-
forcement and belief-based special cases for Game 3. The predictions they
generate are shown in Figure 3. These are done on the rst 24 periods of
our data; the last eight periods are a holdout sample we try to predict. The
most signicant feature of the Game 3 data is that there is relatively little
variance in the frequency of play of dierent strategies. The strategies m
1
jt
1
and a
1
jm
1
are played with virtually constant frequency throughout the game,
a
2
jm
2
is highly variable, but has no real trend and m
1
jt
2
shows a steady in-
crease. The parameter estimates show this lack of variance in the large initial
experience counts and the depreciation parameters close to one.
^
N
m1
(0), in
particular, achieves its maximum value, reecting the relative stability of m
1
play. This stability is reinforced by
^
 > ^ which means that past attractions
are amplied, so attractions are not bounded by payos and this convergence
can be quite sharp, as it is with the m
1
data.
Table 4 presents a number of goodness of t statistics which we use to
compare models. The rst row presents the average per period log-likelihood
(summed across subjects) for the rst 24 periods. This is the number that
was minimized in estimation. The second row presents the same statistic
for the 25
th
through 32
nd
periods, the holdout sample into which we hope
to predict. These statistics can be used to compare models, but there is no
penalty for extra degrees of freedom. The third rows presents the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and the fourth row presents the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC).
17
These statistics can be compared directly and used
for model calibration; they are designed to reach a maximum value at an op-
timal tradeo between improvement of t and additional parameters, even
when models are non-nested.
17
The AIC is the total in-sample log-likelihood minus the number of model parameters,
divided by the number of sample periods (24). It is widely used for model comparison,
but not motivated by any optimality considerations. The BIC is the total in-sample log-
likelihood minus the half the number of model parameters times the natural log of the
number of observations, divided by the number of sample periods (24). Under certain
regularity conditions (which are not satised if parameters are either estimated on or
restricted to a boundary), the BIC can be interpreted as follows: if model i has a higher
BIC than j, then expf 24  (BIC
i
  BIC
j
)g is an approximation to the posterior odds
ratio, Pr(BIC
i
)/Pr(BIC
j
), of a Bayesian observer with equal priors (Carlin and Louis,
1996).
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The second section of Table 4 presents some alternative measures of t.
The rst two rows present the in and out of sample miss rate. The miss rate
is the percentage of the time the strategy that is predicted most likely to be
chosen by the model is not selected by the experimental subject. The second
two rows give the average per period mean squared deviation.
18
The columns of Table 4 all represent models discussed in this paper, ex-
cept for the last one. The last column is a model we propose for comparison.
It is determined by taking as the model prediction the frequency of play of
each strategy throughout the 24-period calibration sample; its predictions
are horizontal lines determined by the data.
Comparing choice reinforcement's miss rate and MSD to those of EWA
and the baseline, we can say it does not t the data well; it barely does
better than a horizontal line. It does not t the data well because it does
not use foregone payo information. Figure 3 shows that reinforcement mis-
takenly predicts t
2
senders move slightly away from m
1
, when in fact they
move strongly toward it. The reason is that m
2
is usually met with the ac-
tion response a
2
, so it yields a payo of 15 for t
2
s. This payo reinforces
that choice positively and leads them to choose it again, moving them away
from m
1
. But in EWA and belief learning, what the t
1
s learn from choosing
m
1
inuences the attractions for t
2
(through updating of the unrealized type
attractions). Then t
2
s gradually learn that message m
1
would pay 30, which
is better than 15, and this indirect learning moves them toward m
1
. As a
result, we can see the AIC and BIC both suggest that the additional param-
eters of EWA are more than justied by the improvement in t, although
the BIC also reects the atness of the data, suggesting that EWA does not
represent a signicant improvement over the baseline.
19
The belief-based special case ts much better than the choice reinforce-
ment model, but still not as well as EWA. Again, the belief model fails to
18
This is calculated by creating, for each subject in each period, a vector with length
equal to the number of strategies. The strategy chosen by the subject in that period is
assigned a 1, and all others are zero. The MSD is the sum of squared dierences between
the created vector and the corresponding vector of choice probabilities predicted by the
model, averaged across subjects and periods (but not across strategies).
19
Note that the conventional way to make this comparison is a 
2
test. We do not use
it because the fact that some parameters are estimated and/or restricted to be on their
boundaries violates the assumptions of the Central Limit Theorem necessary to show that
2(LL
i
  LL
j
) has a 
2
distribution. However, the bootstrapped CIs from the model
parameters which signicantly inuence t (Æ; ; ) suggest dierent conclusions are very
unlikely.
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adequately track the increasing frequency of play m
1
jt
2
. The problem is that
the large values of
^
 = :98, along with large initial experience counts, means
it takes a lot of experience to alter the t
2
sender's beliefs, so the belief model
does not allow learning which is fast enough. This subtle point also illus-
trates why we wanted to apply EWA to these type of data. The original BH
story about belief formation is not precise about strength of prior, ctitious
play weight, and other parameter values.
20
By estimating EWA one is forced
to be very precise about the details of the model. It may not be possible
to nd congurations of parameters which can t the initial conditions, the
basic trend, and also get the speed of convergence right. The sluggish be-
lief learning of m
1
jt
2
in Game 3 shows that while the belief account gets
the direction right, it does poorly on convergence speed, and adding EWA
exibility improves the t a lot.
Table 5 presents the parameter ts for Game 5. Figure 4 shows the
predictions they generate. Unlike Game 3, there is a signicant trend to track
in all the information sets. Look rst at the central parameters, Æ,  and .
The estimated
^
Æ = :54, which is consistent with previous ndings in games
of complete information. This suggests that senders update the foregone
type about half as much as they do their realized type. The depreciation
parameters are also well within the range found in complete information
games, and
^
 > ^, which means that attractions are growing over time, and
are not bounded by payos.
The initial experience counts are only .62 and 3.37. Together with depre-
ciation parameters much less than one, low experience counts mean initial
attractions are fairly quickly swamped by the experience gained in the play of
the game. The initial attractions for the sender suggest the observed initial
type dependence, and suggest receivers should respond to m
1
with a pre-
dominance of a
2
, and to m
2
with about equal frequencies of a
1
and a
3
. In
this environment, where m
2
comes mostly from t
1
s, a
3
has a lower expected
utility for the receiver a
1
, but it has the appeal of equity, which may be
particularly strong in the case when subjects must switch roles from period
to period.
The choice reinforcement model discounts previous attractions at about
the same rate as the EWA model, but the restrictions on Æ,  and the N(0)s
have signicant impact on the model's t. The primary feature of the sender's
20
In their entry games, Cooper et al. (1997a,b) do specify parameter values, as do
Brandts and Holt in 1994.
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data that reinforcement does not t is the gradual decrease in the frequency
of play of m
1
given t
2
(until the sharp jump in the last block). Since m
1
gets reinforced by 30 for t
2
, it is getting strongly reinforced. As in Game 3,
the t
1
choices of m
2
demonstrate to players that if t
2
s were to switch to m
2
,
they might get 45; this unrealized type reinforcement helps explain why they
switch. By leaving unrealized type reinforcement out, choice reinforcement
cannot account for the basic trend in m
1
jt
2
. Similarly, it is too slow to adjust
to the initial decrease and subsequent increase in the frequency of a
2
given
m
1
, so it must t the initial periods with an essentially smooth function.
We can compare this model with EWA using Table 6. Because it adapts
too slowly to account for most major features of the data, the AIC and BIC
tell us that the additional parameters of EWA are more than justied by the
corresponding improvement in t.
The belief-based model does a better job of capturing the gradual decrease
and sudden increase in the frequency of play of m
1
given t
2
; it does almost
as well as EWA. However, it predicts essentially constant play for the a
2
in
response to m
1
, and an essentially constant rate of increase for a
1
in response
to m
2
. This mirrors our ndings for Game 3: the belief-based model, which
formalizes the BH dynamic, gets the direction right, but adding the exibility
of EWA substantially improves tracking of convergence.
5.2 Fitting the Unchosen Message Models
The estimates show that EWA is not too complicated (and that reinforcement
and belief models are too simple), because the baseline EWA model oers
signicant improvement over the special cases. Now we look at the more
complicated alternative models of unchosen message reinforcement. We do
this to discover whether or not our EWA model fails to capture any signicant
aspect of the sender's behavior.
Table 7 presents the parameter estimates for Game 3 for the three alter-
native models we consider here, and Figure 5 presents the predictions they
generate. The most striking feature of the table is that, while they each oer
signicant improvement over EWA, they all have similar parameter estimates
and oer similar ts. There is a signicant feature of senders' behavior EWA
is not capturing, and all of these models capture it equally well.
The alternative models have similar initial attractions to EWA, but the
values of the experience counts switches, so
^
N
m2
(0) >
^
N
m1
(0), and the op-
erational parameters have a dierent relationship. Unlike in EWA,
^
 < 1,
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so the initial attractions are depreciated as the game is played. The simu-
lated experience increment, ^  1:07, indicates that a period of simulated
experience is worth slightly more than a period of actual experience. In the
convex combination model, the ^ = 0 means that all the weight is put on
the maximum, which is 45 in most information states; the median is 30 in
all information states, which means that the lower value of ^
2
for the con-
vex combination model makes the payo's eect on the attraction about the
same in each model.
That
^
 < 1 suggests that the unchosen message models are more respon-
sive to payos than EWA. This can be seen in the rst 16 periods of the m
1
jt
2
series, where EWA makes a very at prediction but the data start below the
EWA prediction and increase. EWA must make a at prediction, with a
high initial experience count and no discounting, because the low payos
typically received from selecting m
2
jt
2
(almost always 15) are inconsistent
with the slow rate of switching to m
1
jt
2
. The unchosen message models,
however, slow response to low payos from m
2
jt
2
by increasing the attrac-
tion to m
2
jt
2
whenever m
1
is chosen in response to t
1
, which it almost always
is. In this case, the attraction to m
2
jt
2
is updated, in the median model, with
a payo of 0:68  30 > 15. Thus the attraction to m
2
jt
2
is slightly increased
(on average) about half the time (when the type is t
1
), only slightly decreased
when the subject chooses m
2
jt
2
(when the unchosen message models are also
able to slow switching by updating m
1
jt
2
with a payo of 0 because 
1
= 0),
and signicantly decreased once the subject switches to m
1
jt
2
. This pattern
matches the data more closely than the EWA predictions.
The unchosen message model estimates for Game 5 are presented in Table
8, and the predictions they generate in Figure 6. As with Game 3, the
behavior of each of Game 5's alternative models is similar to EWA, and very
similar to one-another. This again suggests that if there is some signicant
pattern in the data not captured by EWA, these three models capture it
in the same way. What is less clear than in Game 3, however, is that the
improvement in t from modeling the unchosen messages is worth the extra
degrees of freedom. The AIC suggests the trade-o is worth it, but the BIC
concludes the model is not worth the additional parameters.
Unlike Game 3, where reinforcing the unchosen message allowed the
model of predict turning points in the data that the relatively at EWA pre-
diction did not, EWA predicts most of the uctuation in the data in Game
5. Therefore there is no pattern in the data not captured by EWA which we
can examine to determine how the unchosen message models achieve their
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improved t; the unchosen message reinforcement models are just a little
closer to the data at several points. The only place where this dierence is
substantial is the second half of the sample where EWA is not able to track
the rapid decrease in the frequency of m
1
jt
2
. This is a key feature of the data
because this decrease represents a move toward the sequential equilibrium.
The unchosen message models are able to achieve better t here because
they can decrease the attraction to m
1
jt
2
every time m
2
is chosen. In partic-
ular, the attraction to m
1
jt
2
is decreased each time the player is a t
1
sender
(since t
1
senders almost always choose m
2
). Thus, as experience is gained,
the frequency of m
1
jt
2
decreases, which causes further, more dramatic, de-
creases in the attraction to m
1
jt
2
because 
1
= 0. EWA cannot decrease
this attraction whenever m
2
is played, so it cannot decrease fast enough to
track the data. As in Game 3, the unchosen message models improve on
EWA in much the same way as EWA improved on the belief-based models:
the additional consideration of the payo table better captures the speed of
convergence as well as the direction.
6 Discussion
Our rst objective in this paper was to replicate Brandts and Holt's results.
We closely replicated their results. However, the additional periods we ran
demonstrated that the convergence in Game 5 is slower than expected, and
even 64 periods is not enough to realize equilibrium.
Using these data, we tested our adaptation of EWA to signalling games.
Our baseline model reinforcement the foregone payo for a sender's unre-
alized type. This allows the sender to make all valid inferences given that
receivers are most likely playing message-contingent strategies. This model
performed signicantly better than its choice reinforcement and belief-based
special cases. The belief-based case is of particular interest because it for-
malizes the BH dynamic. Our results indicate that while the BH dynamic
captures the direction of the frequency trends, the formal belief-based restric-
tions do not allow the model to converge at the same rate as the data. This
is particularly pronounced in Game 5, where long run simulations (50,000
periods) using Median players suggest that play never converges to either
pure strategy equilibrium.
Although EWA performs better than its special cases, it may also be that
EWA itself is too simple. Looking at the results from both games, updating
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unchosen messages does improve upon EWA's ability to t the data and to
predict out of sample. In developing the alternative models, we expected to
capture a few specic features of the subjects' learning process. One such
feature is the relative size of imagined experience, represented by  . Since
the unchosen message is updated, it is necessary to update its experience
count as well. Because this experience is a result of the learner's conjecture,
we hypothesized it is less valuable than actual experience. This was weakly
supported, as  is less than one in Game 3 and about one in Game 5.
A second feature we hoped to capture was the imagination coeÆcient
on the realized type-unchosen message payo and unrealized type-unchosen
message payo. We expected them to have a multiplicative eect: 
1
requires
only one level of counterfactual reasoning, but 
2
requires two, suggesting

2
would be on the order of 
1
 Æ. This expectation is not realized in our
estimates, however, as 
1
is zero in both games and 
2
is greater than zero.
This result is surprising because it implies that imagination is not necessarily
nested: senders will go through two counterfactuals without learning from
one. It also means that senders do not try to answer the natural question of
whether or not they would have done better by choosing the other message.
Finally, we hoped to gain some insight into how subjects reinforce un-
chosen messages. The three unchosen message models we examine produce
essentially similar ts on the two games we have examined. Because of its
extra parameter, we conclude the convex combination payo model is inferior
to the median and sophisticated payo models (indeed its AIC and BIC are
higher for both games). The other two models are not statistically distin-
guishable on the two games we have examined. Thus, while we have been
able to determine that senders do update the unchosen message attractions
and the unchosen message experience counts with values less than one, we
have not been successful in explaining what determines the value added to
the attractions of the unchosen message. Based on these results, one might
use any of the three unchosen message models and expect to do adequately.
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